Abstract -As a safety critical system, train control system matters in passengers life and properties. It is important that how to guarantee the safety of train control system. Safety testing is an effective method to detect the safety holes and bugs in the system. However, most safety testing for train control system is manually executed based on expertise, which leads to a huge testing workload. Besides, manual generation will easily cause the problem of missing test cases.
Introduction
The CTCS-3 Onboard system is a typical safety-critical system, responsible for the implementation of train protection. The functional correctness of the onboard system reflected not only in the correctness of the logic output, but also in completion of time-constrained. Any fault would cause grave losses of life and property. Therefore, it is very important to ensure the functional correctness in the onboard system, and testing is the mainly method which focus on the conformance relation between the specification and the system under test.
Safety testing should be considered as much as possible besides the functional testing, it is executed with test cases including the unexpected events, which contain a huge and generally inexhaustible collection. For the train control system, we define an executable test case is a test sequence which starts from the initial state of the system, after a series changes of state, finally returns to the initial state.
Most of the traditional safety test cases for train control system are manually connected and generated based on the expert experience, which leads to a huge testing workload because of the complexity of train control system. Besides, manual generation will easily cause the problem of missing test contents. Therefore the method of automatic test cases generation will satisfy the need of safety testing for high-speed railway train control system better.
With the widespread of formal method, a lot of automatic test case generation technologies are introduced, and modelbased testing (MBT) has been gradually used. It can provide structured, repeatable, optional test cases and avoid the subjectivity of manual generation. In this paper, we establish the test models based on the timed automata theory, and do the research on the method of model-based automatic safety test case generation for the onboard system.
Analyzing the safety-related functions of onboard system should be done before establishing the model. We use Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to identify and analyze the faults and imported them into the under-test system (onboard system) models built to get safety test models.
Safety Function Analysis of Mode Transition Function

A. The characteristics of mode transition function
The CTCS-3 onboard system communicates with the environment by specified interfaces, includes the train, the driver, and the trackside external equipment.
Onboard system needs to manage different running modes according to the different conditions, and modes should be transited automatically or human involved. The mode transition function is one of the most important functions of the onboard system. Therefore, we take it as representative to do the method research. The onboard system model is simplified into that the onboard VC (Vital Computer) transports information with environment through specified interfaces and manages internal state information (mode), which is shown in Fig.1 . The mode transition condition can be classified as following:
1) Integrity of the trackside information, such as the integrity of movement authority (MA); 2) Artificial responsible for driving; 3) Emergency situation treatment; 4) Special signals, such as the sleep signal, isolation signal, cab activation signal; 5) Train current state, such as stop, limit speed, etc. According to their characteristics, the mode transition can be divided into upgrade transition and degrade transition. The definitions are as follows:
1) Upgrade transition: the condition before the transition is more strict than after, that means the former mode is more safety; 2) Degrade transition: the condition before the transition is less strict than after, that means the latter mode is more safety; We should focus on the restricted speed changing and the equipment responsibility coverage in upgrade and degrade transition.
After a brief analysis of the mode transition function, the next step is to analyze it with FTA.
B. Safety function analysis for mode transition based on FTA
The core function of onboard system is to prevent the collision or derailment which caused by exceeding the safe speed or distance. So collision/derailment is selected as the core hazard of fault tree analysis for safety test.
If the human factors are not considered, the possible reasons of collision/ derailment could be further analyzed as following:
1) Exceeding the stop point, which is caused by failing to stop or reduce to certain speed at a specified point; 2) Invocatable physical fault in front section, like broken rail; The fault of exceeding the stop point could be further decomposed into: 1) Wrong information from trackside equipment; 2) Unsuccessful mode transition, in which the state judgment is error and the train fails to brake. According to above analysis, the system fault tree is shown in Fig. 2 .
In conclusion, unsuccessful mode transition is one of the most important reasons. According to the definition, the mode transition can also be divided into safety-related transition and safety-unrelated transition. Safety-unrelated mode transition is decided with the following rules: 1. It is a upgrade transition, which transit from the high-limited state to the low-limited state, only operation efficiency is influenced by unsuccessful mode transition. Once the transition was unsuccessful, the constraints of environment would not be broken; 2. The train needs to stop when the mode is changing, failing in this kind of transition also won't lead to safety accidents.
Safety-related mode transition is decided with the following rules: 1. Brake is required to apply after the mode transition; 2. It is a degrade transition, the operation capacity of external environment declines, and it is necessary to reduce the running speed. Once the transition is not successful, it will break the constraints of the environment and cause accidents.
According to above analysis, we keep decomposing the fault and get the fault tree shown in Fig. 3 According to the FTA result, mode transition in CTCS-3 are classified as Table I.   TABLE I Mode transition classification   Type Mode Transition
Safety-related SH->TR, OS->TR, CO->TR., FS->TR, CO>OS, FS->OS, FS->CO Safety-unrelated
Other mode transition
Through the analysis of onboard function, we confirmed the safety-related mode transition. On this basis, it is possible to conduct the safety test case generation.
Automatic Generation of Test Cases for Onboard System
A. Establishing The Safety Function Model of Mode Transition
In order to get the safety test cases, we need to establish a safety function model of the system under test. According to the definition and the onboard system simplified model shown in Fig.1 , the network automata model of the onboard system is established using the UPPAAL tool. As in Fig.4 , the vital computer (VC) automaton is selected as the subject for study, the external environment includes train, Balise, RBC and Driver automaton. The entire system network automata model is divided as kernel part and environment, i.e. VC ||Environment, V-E model for short. The automata are showed in Fig.5 to Fig.9 .
The driver automaton is depicted in Fig.5 , which realizes the following functions:
1)
The driver opened/closed the cab, start/end the model running; 2)
Sending the shunting requirement; 3)
Acknowledgement the requirement from VC; The balise automaton is depicted in Fig.6 . It is mainly responsible for sending specific section information to the onboard equipment, including stop command in on sight section and trip protection command.
The RBC automaton is depicted in Fig.7 , which realizes the following functions: 1) Sending MA to the onboard (VC), including normal MA and the emergency stop message; 2)
Responsing the shunting requirement from Driver The train automaton is depicted in Fig.8 . It is mainly responsible for storing data and train states in the progress of interacting message with other automata The VC automaton is depicted in Fig.9 . It is mainly responsible for judging the mode transition conditions and finishing the transition according to the train state recorded by train automaton and message received from the external environment. According to the FTA result, we created two states, Collision and Derailment, when establishing the safety function model of VC, as shown in Fig.9 . With FS to CO, for example, the transition variable fs2co_col turns to 1 from initial value 0 when the mode transition is failed, indicated the collision accident has accrued, then the VC model transits to the state of Collision, as indicated in yellow path in Fig.10 .
B. Safety Test Cases Generation for Mode Transition
Based on the V-E model and Observer automata theory, we generated safety test cases for mode transition with CoVer, a tool developed by Uppsala University for real-time system automatic test cases generation.
Considering the feature of V-E network automata model and Observer Automata, we use user-defined coverage criteria (shown in Fig. 11 ) to generate the mode transition test cases by going through all the safety function variables of mode transition in the model. According to above observer automata, coverage criteria and the definitions of safety-related mode transition variables, we have got safety test cases for mode transition testing. For example, we defined the search object to all the path satisfied the variable fs2co_col:=1, then we get the test suite of collision resulted from unsuccessful transition of FS to CO. It contains one test case(trace 1), the test steps and path is shown in Fig.12 
Conclusion
Traditional test cases of CTCS-3 onboard system are manually generated depending on expert experience, the test is subjective, low efficiency and time consuming, and it is difficult to ensure the test completeness. In this paper, a faultmodel based method to generate test cases automatically for onboard system is proposed. Firstly, mode transition function was analyzed by FTA to get the safety-related functions; secondly, V-E timed network automata model of mode transition is established, based on the model and Observer automata theory, we have generated all the test cases for mode transition by CoVer using the user-defined coverage criteria, there are 7 safety-related test cases, 44 test steps, 57 other safety-unrelated test cases, 121 test steps. The safety test cases of mode transition are proven useful for classifying and testing the onboard subsystem. It can improve the test pertinence, efficiency and accuracy.
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